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“Advertising for Prestige”: Publicity in 
Canada-United States Arctic Defence 
Cooperation, 1946-48
David J. Bercuson
At the end of the Second World War, Canada and the United States began to cooperate more closely than ever on questions of contin-ental defence.1 Both nations held similar views about the political 
nature of the Soviet Union although there was some difference in the per-
ceptions that United States and Canadian military leaders held about Soviet 
military capabilities and intentions at that time. It was also clear to Canadian 
leaders that the United States was determined to make its defensive stand 
as far forward as it could – in the Canadian Arctic – and that it was not in 
Canada’s own interests to attempt to deny American access to the Canadian 
north. That situation created a number of defence and foreign policy dilem-
mas for Canadian policymakers. One of the most difficult to resolve was how 
much to tell the world – and the Canadian people – about what was happen-
ing in the North, and why.
 By the summer of 1946 Canadian-American negotiations, discussions, 
and planning about joint continental defence had begun although they 
were not far advanced. There were a small number of American troops sta-
tioned on Canadian soil in places such as the cold weather testing facilities 
at Churchill, Manitoba. In addition, American naval units were about to 
mount a small-scale exercise in the Arctic islands, and US Air Force B-29s 
were conducting regular long range training and weather survey flights 
from Iceland to Alaska over the Canadian Arctic. The joint Canadian-US 
Military Cooperation Committee was busy drawing up a grandiose plan for 
a continental air-defence system that was never instituted and the United 
States had sought permission to construct a chain of weather stations across 
the Canadian Arctic. The stations would be operated by the United States 
Weather Bureau, a civilian agency, but they were clearly military in intent.2
 This was something new for Canada. Prior to 1940, there had been vir-
tually no Canada-United States defence relationship. American troops or 
installations, civil or military, on Canadian soil, or joint Canadian-American 
defence planning, would have been unheard of. That had changed after the 
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fall of France with the issuance of the Ogdensburg Declaration and the estab-
lishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) in August 1940. But 
that change had taken place under the pressures of wartime and the extreme 
danger that Britain had been in 1940.3 Now, peace had come again and al-
though Canadian leaders fully realized that the world had changed dramat-
ically and that the United States was now the only nation that could help 
safeguard Canada, they feared that the Canadian people and the Canadian 
press would be slower to come around. Britain had always been Canada’s 
great ally and, in 1945, Canada was as Anglophilic as ever. The safest course 
in mid-1946 seemed to be to conceal as much of the Canada-US cooperative 
effort as possible.
 If anyone in Ottawa truly believed that that was feasible, a series of stor-
ies in the Financial Post in June and July 1946 must have smashed that illusion. 
With lurid headlines Ken Wilson of the Post declared that Canada was go-
ing to be “Another Belgium in U.S. Air Bases Proposal” but that Ottawa had 
managed to kill “U.S. Plans to man weather stations in the Canadian Arctic.”4 
There was no “U.S. Air Bases Proposal,” but Wilson’s story about the weather 
stations was fact; the Cabinet had turned down the American request on 29 
June.5 How had Wilson found out? Obviously a matter highly sensitive to 
both governments had been leaked. That in itself pointed to the difficulty of 
keeping these things under tight wraps.
 The Canadian government’s effort to keep the details of the new Canada-
United States defence partnership under cover was not helped by an incident 
that took place in late September 1946. In an off-the-record conversation with 
Time magazine correspondent Larry Laybourne during a visit to New York, 
Secretary of State Paul Martin said that the Canadian government faced 
important decisions in the field of joint defence and that he was “staggered 
by the expense of the installations which Canada would have to finance.”6 
Martin was undoubtedly referring to the MCC’s soon-to-be-shelved air 
defence plans. Laybourne then contacted American government officials 
to try to pry more information out of them but was told that any publicity 
regarding Canada-United States defence activities at that point would em-
barrass US Secretary of State James Byrnes, then attending the Paris Peace 
Conference. Laybourne chose to sit on the story but Time’s representative in 
Ottawa tried to get details about Arctic defence installations from the United 
States embassy there. At the same time Maclean’s reporter Blair Fraser and 
the Financial Post’s Wilson were also poking around. Ottawa asked the State 
Department to help and Laybourne was contacted a second time and told to 
back off but not before the Canadians were reminded “where the responsibil-
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ity for putting Time magazine on the trail lay.” The Americans might not 
have been so compliant if they were not “alive to the danger of prejudicing 
Canadian Government decisions by unfortunate publicity.”7
 By the end of November 1946, both the United States State Department 
and the Canadian Department of External Affairs were trying to patch up a 
problematic defence relationship. Then, at the end of the month, came “The 
Watch on the Arctic” by Blair Fraser. This was a lengthy article in Maclean’s 
which sketched out the extent of the joint defence projects underway, dis-
cussed Operation Musk Ox – a recent joint exercise in the north – and which 
offered a pretty complete analysis of the backstage negotiations between 
Ottawa and Washington to settle the terms of further continental defence 
planning. There were numerous quotes from unnamed sources who were 
obviously in the Canadian or US military.8 The American embassy in Ottawa 
thought the piece of “more than ordinary importance” because of Fraser’s 
reputation and Maclean’s circulation. In their view, the article reflected “con-
versations with officials who were very conversant with recent negotiations.” 
The Americans did not find the article unfriendly, but thought it showed “a 
pre-occupation with what the Russians will think and with the need for a 
cautious and gradual approach to the problem.” As they themselves admit-
ted, that attitude seemed to be “prevalent among certain Canadian officials;”9 
it was certainly the view of the Prime Minister.10
 The growing press attention – and the increasing accuracy of the spate 
of newspaper and magazine stories – undoubtedly provided the motive for 
both governments to put the subject of “publicity with regard to joint defence 
projects” on the agenda for an important high level (and top secret) meeting 
on continental defence held in Ottawa on 16 and 17 December 1946.11 The 
meeting brought Canadian and American diplomats (including the State 
Department’s leading Soviet expert, George Kennan) and military men 
together to try to break the log jam of continental defence issues that had 
been building up since early summer. The discussions were wide ranging; in 
two days many misunderstandings were cleared up and the stage was set for 
a successful long-term defence partnership.12 
 There were two issues related to publicity that needed to be resolved at 
the get-together. The first was connected to Recommendation 35 of the PJBD 
which had been adopted by the Board and forwarded to the two governments 
in late September. This document (eventually approved as Recommendation 
36) was, in essence, a joint Canada-United States defence treaty that estab-
lished the principles upon which virtually all post-war continental defence 
arrangements were to be based. The original version approved by the PJBD 
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the previous spring had not gone far enough in protecting Canadian sover-
eignty and had been referred back to the Board by the Canadian Cabinet. 
The new version had been accepted by King’s government in mid-November 
but details about its promulgation and what to say about it in public were still 
unresolved.13 The second issue was the stickier question about how the two 
governments ought to handle general publicity about joint defence projects.
 The first matter was resolved simply; both governments would issue a 
statement summarizing, but not quoting, the PJBD recommendation on the 
same day.14 Regarding the second problem, Ottawa recognized that “it would 
clearly be impossible to maintain complete secrecy about [northern defence 
plans] even if secrecy were desirable” and thus that some information about 
defence projects would have to be shared with the press and public. The 
course suggested was to first “state unequivocally but unsensationally that 
certain defence activities were regarded as necessary in order to insure the 
security of the continent against the possibility of future air attack over the 
Pole.” If that did not work and the public reaction proved too great, then “it 
might well be possible to place a minimum of emphasis on preparations for 
defence and to stress the civil benefits that can be anticipated from improv-
ing our knowledge of northern conditions.”15 Such a course had, in fact, first 
been suggested by US President Harry S. Truman when he had met with 
the prime minister in Washington in late October.16 Although the Americans 
saw the problem as a “purely Canadian one” both delegations at the Ottawa 
meeting agreed that “there might be advantages to carrying out certain of 
the earlier parts of the projected programme under civilian auspices.” The 
United States would help with the subterfuge where it could.17 
 That solved little, as both governments soon found out. On Sunday, 
22 December, the American liberal daily P.M. published an inflammatory 
article by Leslie Roberts claiming that Canada feared being the “ham” in a 
US-Soviet “Sandwich.” The tone of the piece was set early: “official Canada 
today is more frightened of American militarism than of Soviet expansion. 
For more than a year Uncle Sam’s northern neighbor has been the victim of 
continuing pressures from the US Army to permit American occupation of 
the Canadian Arctic.”18 Undersecretary of State Lester B. Pearson sent a copy 
of the Roberts’ article to King along with a note that although he did not 
think the story would cause any harm, it was “irritating to see this kind of 
thing in print.”19 The State Department took note of the article but thought it 
“up to the Canadian government to comment if it so wishes.”20
 The Americans did not react to the Roberts piece, but the Soviets cer-
tainly did. The Soviet ambassador to the United States called on Hume 
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Wrong at the Canadian embassy in Washington to inquire about the article 
and was told that it was “a tissue of falsehoods and exaggerations which 
should not be taken seriously.” Wrong tried to re-assure the Russian that the 
American presence in the Canadian Arctic was nowhere near as extensive as 
Roberts had indicated. He told him that future articles of that ilk were to be 
expected but that if the Russians were concerned, he would be happy to give 
them as much information as he could on the truth behind the press stories.21 
In attempting to reassure the Soviets that they had nothing to fear, Wrong 
was again echoing the attitudes of many Canadian policymakers. Canada’s 
Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton was so worried about what the 
Russians would think that he actually invited the Soviet military attaché in 
Ottawa to take part in a tour of foreign military attaches of the Churchill test 
facilities in the spring of 1947.22 The US consul general in Montreal thought 
the invitation amounted to an “appease-Russia” attitude.23 
 On 12 February 1947, Canada and the United States issued formal state-
ments declaring to the world that they had both endorsed Recommendation 
36 of the PJBD. The actual text of the recommendation was not released. It 
was the explicit beginning of a continental defence relationship that exists to 
this day, but it did not solve the problem of how information about defence 
activities in the Canadian Arctic were to be publicized by either of the two 
governments or, indeed, if they were to be publicized at all. Claxton was 
particularly worried about information regarding American activities in the 
Canadian north getting out. When the cabinet finally approved the American 
request to begin construction of a chain of weather stations in the north, 
Claxton ordered the RCAF to ensure that United States Air Force transports 
bringing men, supplies and equipment to the construction sites stay away 
from “heavily populated and urban areas.”24
 Claxton may well have been more sensitive than most of his colleagues 
to a possible adverse public reaction to the news of American presence in the 
Canadian north. He had an overdeveloped sense of smell when it came to 
sniffing out political trouble. But on this issue, he was not wrong, as he and 
the government found to their consternation in early June 1947. That was 
when Claxton introduced a bill into the House of Commons to give Canadian 
courts complete jurisdiction over American troops for all matters which were 
offences under Canadian law. American service courts would retain their 
jurisdiction only for crimes committed under United States military law, 
which were not also covered by Canadian statute.25 
 The bill was innocuous enough, but many opposition members saw 
a good opportunity to embarrass Claxton and the government. They de-
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manded to know how many US troops there were in Canada, what they 
were doing, and why they were there at all. There were heated claims that 
Canada was surrendering its sovereignty to the United States: “Where will 
it end?” one opposition member demanded to know, “What will happen 
when the Chinese are here? What will happen if the Russians come here?”26 
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation MP Harry Archibald declared that 
the bill represented the last step to American absorption of Canada.27 
 Given the government’s majority, the bill passed without difficulty, 
but the length and tone of the debate were disturbing to both Ottawa and 
Washington.28 Newly appointed US Secretary of State General George C. 
Marshall told Truman there was “an element in [Canada] which declares that 
the arrangements constitute a violation of Canadian sovereignty and preju-
dice the chance of Canada maintaining peaceful relations with the Soviet 
Union.” He suggested that discussions about joint defence issues with King 
on Truman’s forthcoming visit to Canada (he was to visit Ottawa from 10-12 
June 1947) be done only “informally and privately.”29 Claxton told the US 
ambassador that he hoped if the press asked Truman about American troops 
in Canada, the president would say only that “the numbers are very small 
and the operations of a routine character but that it is not desirable to give out 
the information.”30
 As defence activity in the north increased following the spring break-
up in 1947, the problem of press leaks and publicity grew apace. In Ottawa 
the debate centred on the question of whether the government should issue 
press releases only to correct “damaging and incorrect” press speculation 
or whether it should strike first with “initial governmental guidance in the 
form of suitable...press statements.”31 The problem was much more serious 
in Washington where the three armed forces seemed to compete with each 
other in the publicity arena in order to position themselves more favourably in 
the ongoing battle for a bigger piece of the defence spending pie. As one State 
Department official put it: “Press officers in War and Navy are evidently under 
considerable pressure to hand out stories about plans and operations in the far 
north. The pressure comes from some of their own people who want adver-
tising for prestige and appropriations purposes and who are ignorant of the 
international implications....” The Canadian experts at State were both well 
aware of and sensitive to Ottawa’s desire to play down American activity in 
the Canadian north. The question was how to do it in a free society with a free 
press where it was both impossible and undesirable to try to muzzle the press 
entirely. State suggested that a standard policy be drawn up and that a direc-
tive implementing that policy be “issued at a high level” to keep the American 
military in line, “off the necks of the Canadians,” and acting in concert. 32 
117
DAVID J. BERCUSON
 In mid-September 1947, the PJBD discussed the publicity problem at 
great length. It concluded that the lack of a policy to guide the release of 
information regarding Canada-United States operations in the north had 
“resulted in unnecessary confusion and misunderstandings... [and] need-
lessly irritated relationships between... [government] departments...and...has 
been a cause of some difficulty to the Canadian government.” The Board 
even found that military secrets were in danger of being compromised. It 
thus urged the US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to “establish 
a clearly-defined policy with respect to publicity...that appropriate directives 
be issued from a high level...and that measures should be taken to coordinate 
and expedite through prescribed channels proposed publicity concerning 
a given project.”33 As a result, Secretary of State Marshall approached US 
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal with a proposal that both men work 
to implement the PJBD’s recommendation.34 Forrestal replied that, with one 
minor exception, the views of the PJBD were “quite in line with my own 
ideas.”35 With such powerful support, it was only a matter of time before the 
American military establishment was brought into line.
 On 19 November Marshall, Forrestal and the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force issued a “Directive Concerning Publicity Relating to 
Joint Canadian-United States Defense Plans and Operations.” The document 
laid out the basic principles that would underlay the release of information 
from the United States regarding continental defence projects. It was based 
on the notion that such defence arrangements should be made known when-
ever and wherever possible, subject only to “limitations necessarily imposed 
by the requirements of military security.” Thus the United States pledged 
itself to release as much information as it could as early as possible on an 
unclassified basis, subject to cooperation and coordination with Canada. It 
pledged, among other things, that public announcements would always be 
approved in advance by both governments. It placed the burden of deciding 
what to release and how to do so on the American members of the PJBD 
and it reigned in overly zealous American military personnel who had been 
in the habit of communicating directly with the Canadian government and 
Embassy.36 It was everything Ottawa could have asked for.
 In Ottawa, the departments of External Affairs, National Defence and 
Transport were busy working on a policy of their own that would parallel 
the one being formulated in the United States. It was approved by Claxton, 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent, and Transport 
Minister Lionel Chevrier at the end of November 1947. The Canadian docu-
ment paralleled the one that had been issued in Washington and declared: 
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“secrecy is counter to the traditions of the United States and of Canada and 
the desired objective is to reach the position where the press and public alike 
recognize that joint undertakings in the Canadian Arctic are normal and 
sensible developments.”37 That, of course would not come for several years 
and certainly not until the threat of Soviet air-atomic attack was palpable to 
nearly everyone.
 The final step in the process of trying to manage public information 
about northern defence activities came with the issuance of a joint under-
standing on 1 April 1948 which essentially repeated the separate but parallel 
documents that had already been promulgated in the two capitals. The two 
governments agreed on four basic principles: 
(1) defence arrangements ought to be publicized “in so far as the 
requirements of Government policy, military security and the 
international situation will permit”; 
(2) the question of how much information to release and when 
would be decided on a case-by-case basis; 
(3) the chief responsibility for the release of information would 
lie with the country on whose territory the defence project was 
based; 
(4) any public announcement should have the approval of both 
governments.38 
The joint policy was re-issued with minor modifications in late September 
1950.39
 The problem of just what information to release and when and the re-
lated issue of how to handle publicity leaks and press reports that reflected 
unfavourably on Canadian-American defence arrangements did not dis-
appear, of course. Press stories that had no basis in fact or which implied 
that Canada was compromising its sovereignty in the Arctic and elsewhere 
would continue to appear through the years.40 That was to be expected. A 
joint policy on how much information to release, and under what circum-
stances, could never be expected to stop the press from writing about one 
of the biggest Canadian stories of post-war era, nor was it intended to do 
so. At least the competition among American military men for an edge on 
each other, at Canada’s expense, ended. At the same time, Canadian sensitiv-
ity about the American presence in the north did ease somewhat after 1950 
when Canada actually found itself fighting alongside the United States in a 
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shooting war against a communist adversary and after the USSR gained an 
air-atomic offensive capability.
 What this entire episode does show is that the United States took its lead 
from Canada from start to finish even when some US officials thought the 
Canadians were too sensitive and too eager to placate the Soviets. When this 
small part of the larger story of Canada-United States defence cooperation is 
examined, the long-standing myth still perpetuated by some Canadian his-
torians of the period that the United States consistently bullied, bludgeoned, 
and blasted Canada to do its bidding, is once again called into question.41 In 
this, as in other aspects of that relationship, Canada benefitted from a neigh-
bour which defined its self-interest in enlightened terms.
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